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Introduction 
 
‘You know, you never beat us on the battlefield?’ 
 
‘That may be so, but it is also irrelevant’ 
 
- Conversation between Colonel Harry Summers and Northern Vietnamese Colonel Tu. 
 
 The relationship between the American media and the Vietnam War is one that has 
often been debated between historians. Prior to the Vietnam War the government underwent 
fundamental changes with regards to their relationship with the press. There was a so called 
'new secrecy' in which the government felt that the need to keep the public (and therefore the 
press) away from information became bigger than ever before. Presidents Truman and 
Eisenhower introduced measures such as the McMahon Act (meant for development and 
control of atomic energy) and Executive Order 10-290 (which gave every Federal Agency the 
right to declare any kind of information 'confidential'). These measures, according to an 
anonymous journalist "gave just about everybody in Washington, including janitors, the right 
to withhold information in the sacred name of national security.
1
 However, despite these 
measures to decrease the influence of the press, the Vietnam War would prove that these 
journalists had more power than ever before. They were out in the trenches acting as paper 
soldiers and have often been both criticized and praised for their work in Vietnam. Most 
criticism came from government officials and journalists like Joe Alsop who believed that the 
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reporters were undermining support for the war. Meanwhile, critics of the war praised them 
for the fact that they didn't serve as a propaganda machine for the U.S. government. 
 David Halberstam was one of the more prominent journalists who was active during 
the Vietnam War, writing articles for the New York Times during his stay in South-East Asia. 
He was one of the journalists who was critical of the government at times, and who, 
especially at the end of his tenure in Vietnam, openly doubted whether the U.S. should have 
gotten involved in Vietnam. There is a general consensus among conservatives that these 
journalists  were reporting in a negative way on purpose. And David Halberstam was one of 
the most prominent journalists who supposedly belonged to this group. Halberstam makes for 
an interesting test case since he has been a very active writer after his tenure in Vietnam. A lot 
of this literature had to with Vietnam and it offers many insights into the war. 
 Today many historians still debate whether it was right for the USA to intervene in 
Vietnam, and there is still a lot of debate going on how the greatest military power in the 
world could not defeat a small Southeast Asian state. The argument that is by far the most 
popular one is that the media was greatly responsible for defeat. As Harry Summers told 
Colonel Tu, Vietnam did not beat the Americans on the battlefield. Vietnamese casualties 
were way higher than American casualties and even their most well known-attack (Tet 
offensive) was actually a military defeat. So if they did not lose it on the ground, there must 
have been a different reason for their defeat. There are numerous claims from the conservative 
corner (including journalist Joe Alsop) that the media was biased, that their reports were 
inaccurate and that they were sensational and incorrect. By doing this they undermined war 
support and once you lose support and the public opinion turns against you it suddenly 
becomes more difficult to successfully wage in a war.   
 The main goal of this research will be to look into the conservative criticism that the 
media lost the war in Vietnam. Even in the field of academics, there is still a lot of debate on 
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the role that the media has played. Daniel Hallin, who has written a study of the influence of 
the media during the Vietnam War, acknowledges that one argument still stands out: the one 
that the media was, deliberately, opposing the government and was in turn responsible for the 
U.S. losing the war.
2
 Hallin calls this the oppositional media thesis and explains that this 
thesis states that the Vietnam War was a crucial turning point in terms of media influence, and 
particularly, with regards to the influence of television. Hallin disputes this view, and states 
that the way in which American journalists conducted their work didn't become actively 
oppositional during the Vietnam War. Critical coverage increased over time, but the ideology 
of objective journalism (which was characteristic of  journalists in the 1960's, according to 
Hallin) stayed very much alive. This thesis will examine the extent to which Halberstam’s 
Vietnam reporting confirms or contradicts the “oppositional media thesis.  
 As one can see there are still many different opinions on the subject. Some researchers 
portray these journalists as heroes and admire them for their critical outlook on the situation 
whereas others are critical of their work and believe that some journalists didn't go far enough 
in their criticism on the war (Daniel Hallin was one of these critics).
34
 For this research we 
shall use David Halberstam as a test case as the topic of discussion would become too broad if 
we were to answer this question by looking at every single journalist that was active during 
the war. Besides that, Halberstam makes for a very useful test case since he has probably been 
the most active writer after his Vietnam-stint. The literature that he has written can be used to 
compare his earlier views from his time at the New York Times and that way we can see if 
there have been any shifts in his opinion on the Vietnam War. 
 What will also be of key importance in this research is the overall role and landscape 
of media in the U.S. and its relationship with the government. As said, the government had 
                                                          
2
 Daniel C. Hallin, "The Media, the War in Vietnam, and Political Support: A Critique of the Thesis of an 
Oppositional Media," The Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 2-3. 
3
 Clarence R. Wyatt, Paper Soldiers, The American Press and the Vietnam War (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1993). 
4
 Daniel C. Hallin, The "Uncensored War" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
5 
 
been trying to decrease the influence of the media and to increase its own influence on 
outgoing reports. Again, we shall use Halberstam as the main test case here to see if he was 
also influenced by the pressure that came from the government and if he was any different 
from the average journalist that was active during this period. It is very clear that the 
landscape of media was changing rapidly.  Was Halberstam a lone wolf in this changing 
landscape or did he, just as others, adapt to the situation? 
 Whether someone like David Halberstam was really undermining war support through 
his reports will be difficult to determine since it is difficult to measure just how much 
influence they had on public support for the war. However, by looking at other reports and 
literature that has covered the media's coverage on the Vietnam War we can try to see whether 
Halberstam was actually more negative than his colleagues and whether his reports were 
sensationalist. 
 For this we shall look at the New York Times and look at the editions that surround 
certain key events. These events led to more extensive media coverage with regards to 
Vietnam and will make good test case to look at Halberstam's reports and compare them to 
reports of certain colleagues at his newspaper. Again, this can be used to determine whether 
Halberstam was obliging to pressure from the New York Times and was just reporting in the 
same way as his fellow New York Times journalists or whether he was an exception. 
 The material that will be used can be easily divided into four categories. Firstly, the 
literature that focuses on the media's influence with regards to the Vietnam War will play a 
crucial part in laying the foundation for the essay. This should give the necessary background 
information on the landscape of the media and how it acted in Vietnam. These books can also 
be divided into two categories, as some will focus explicitly on the Vietnam War, whereas 
others will also look at the period prior to the war as to see what the landscape of journalism 
was like at the time. Secondly, we will use all the literature that David Halberstam has written 
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on the Vietnam War. The reason why this will be used is obvious, he is the central figure in 
this test case and this literature will be used to compare his later views to his earlier views. 
Thirdly, we will also look at other accounts of Vietnam journalists such as Peter Arnett, who 
also wrote a book discussing his time as a journalist in Vietnam. This will be useful to see 
whether Halberstam was one of a kind or whether these journalists all had the same opinion 
when discussing their time in Vietnam. Lastly, the New York Times plays an important role 
as it was the employer for David Halberstam and as we discussed earlier, articles from crucial 
moments in the Vietnam War will be used for this research.   
 The research will start by giving background information on the landscape of the 
media and will also give some background on the journalist who is the main focus in this 
entire research: David Halberstam. This will serve, as we stated earlier, as a foundation for the 
rest of the research. After this beginning chapter we will then start to look more closely at the 
conservative claims that have been made with regards to journalists and the Vietnam War and 
see how Halberstam has been accused and whether his reports can indeed be seen as overly 
anti-government. We will try to answer whether this criticism is fair or whether Halberstam is 
just being used as a scapegoat by conservative criticizers. After these general chapters, we 
will look more closely at one of Vietnam's most crucial events which Halberstam covered: the 
Buddhist crisis and the subsequent fall of the Diem government. Again, Halberstam's reports 
will be used as we try to explain his reporting on the war and again it will be compared to 
colleagues to see whether the conservative criticism is justified. In the fourth chapter the focus 
will switch to Halberstam's colleagues. We will look at reporters that were critical of 
Halberstam but also at reporters that admired him. In this chapter the stance of the New York 
Times will also be looked at. How did they pressure Halberstam and what were the exact 
reasons that they pressured him? Lastly, the changing policy of the U.S. will be combined 
with the literature that Halberstam has written will be used to see if there has been any shift in 
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thinking from his side and how he has tried to explain the Vietnam War and all the criticism 
that was aimed towards him and his colleagues. Has his opinion changed throughout the 
years? Does he regret anything? This will all be discussed in the final chapter as we try to 
come to a conclusion which will have to answer the question whether David Halberstam was 
indeed deliberately negative and a prime example of journalists undermining war support for 
the Vietnam War or whether he was just a young and enthusiastic journalist that was being 
misunderstood by conservatives and was simply despised for doing a good job.  
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Chapter 1 
Landscape of U.S. journalism and politics prior to the 
Vietnam War 
 
'No corner of the building (the White House) seemed to be off limits. [...] On some days more 
reporters went into the White House offices to talk with staff members than did government 
workers who had come on federal matters.' 
 
- Hugh Sidey, reporter for Life magazine, talking about the openness of the Kennedy 
Administration. 
 
 Throughout U.S. history journalism has evolved and expanded its influence. Its power 
to give the public the information that it wants and/or needs has grown over time.  Beginning 
with the electoral victory by John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the government started to realize the 
new potential that the media had and began to use it to improve its own image. Kennedy 
certainly wasn't the first who used the media for his own good, but he did implement new 
measures that greatly improved the governments power in relation to the media. 
 David Halberstam was impressed by Kennedy's new strategies and the way in which 
he adapted to a new era: "John F. Kennedy was, above all else, a marvelously contemporary 
politician  with a shrewd sense of the sources of power [...] and by nature Kennedy had a 
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grasp of the new balance. He knew television and print were becoming more important all the 
time and that was a source of strength for him: he could always sell himself to the media."
5
 
 During Kennedy's first press conference as the president of the United States, he 
moved the meeting to a different site - the State Department building - so as to make it more 
suitable for television broadcasts. Next to that, he did not require journalists to state their 
name and their employer so that he could spend more time answering the questions.  Lastly, 
the most revolutionary change was that he was going to hold this press conference during a 
live telecast. It was a move that journalist James Reston called "the goofiest idea since the 
hula hoop"
6
. But though it was considered to be unorthodox, Kennedy was the man of the 
hour and was praised throughout the country for his performance. He had seen the potential of 
the media and journalism and used it for his own good.
7
 
 Kennedy's charismatic appearance did not only have a positive effect on public 
opinion, but also on the journalists who reported on him during his campaign. Reporters were 
getting more access and information from the White House and Kennedy's staff knew 
everything about the journalists, from their favorite hobbies to which background they came 
from. As a result, many journalists became Kennedy supporters and some even became very 
close friends. Joe Alsop, a Washington Post columnist and a very influential journalist, was 
one of several journalists who had such a good relationship with Kennedy that he became one 
of his closest friends and admirers. 
8
 However, to state that the relationship between the 
government, the media, and the public was now more open and friendlier than ever would be 
incorrect. Even though Kennedy tried to depict himself as the most open and honest president 
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in the history of the U.S. there was enough trouble going on in the background which the 
Kennedy administration was desperately trying to keep away from the outside world. 
 It all started when two American pilots returned home on January 27, 1961. Both 
pilots where held by the Soviet Union after their surveillance plane had been shot down over 
the Barents Sea. These pilots weren't allowed to give any interviews and every speech 
regarding this topic was to be revised by the White House. Several observers were appalled at 
these actions and said that "the demands for even the most routine news information were 
more stringent than any they could recall."
9
 In addition to that, the administration also had a 
desire to use its good relations with the press in order to spread false information and clamp 
down on any report that could benefit their potential enemies. 
10
 Even though most journalists 
were pretty mild in their criticism, some did notice this trend. Eugene Pulliam, a journalist for 
the Indianapolis News and a chairman of the Freedom of Information committee said that 
president Kennedy "failed to live up to his promise of greater freedom of information.". 
However, he and his colleagues did acknowledge that the White House itself had been more 
accessible than ever before. Hugh Sidey, who wrote for Time magazine, said: "No corner of 
the building (the White House) seemed to be off limits. [...] On some days more reporters 
went into the White House offices to talk with staff members than did government workers 
who had come on federal matters." 
11
 
 But this 'openness' towards reporters threatened the objectivity of reporters. The fact 
that the White House seemed more accessible than ever made journalists vulnerable to 
manipulation. James Reston was one of the journalists who saw this trend develop: "It is hard 
to go into that House...and not be impressed with it and the terrible burden that the President 
has to carry. How could you help but be sympathetic? [But] once you become sympathetic, it 
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becomes increasingly difficult to employ the critical faculties."
12
 The fact that reporters were 
generally becoming less critical was a problem as it enabled the White House to control to a 
large extent the information that was given to the public. Furthermore, journalists’ behavior 
was even more influenced by Kennedy's way of telling journalists more than they should 
know. The effect was that journalists felt that they were being given information that no one 
else had.  However, once a reporter decided to use this information, or criticize the president's 
actions altogether, the White House would clamp down on the reporter. Hugh Sidey was one 
of the reporters who fell victim to this as he published an article in Time magazine in which 
he criticized the appointment of General Maxwell Taylor as a special presidential military 
adviser. All of a sudden Sidey, who was one of Kennedy's favorite journalists at the time, 
became an outsider and all of his sources in the White House would continuously ignore his 
requests.
13
 It was a prime example of selective openness by the Kennedy administration. 
Reporters who didn't criticize the administration were given more information whereas others 
were shut out. In addition to that, the government did an excellent job in providing lots of 
information, more than most journalists could handle under their deadline pressures. This kept 
reporters, editors and the public satisfied, but it generally left out the actual truth that was 
ongoing in the background. 
 In April 1961, this led to more trouble with the Bay of Pigs crisis in Cuba, a military 
operation that the government had desperately tried to keep away from the public, until the 
moment it failed and it became impossible to hide. According to Kennedy, it was necessary to 
keep such sensitive military information away from the public. The press responded in fury.  
The St. Louis Dispatch said that the Kennedy administration was undermining 'the essential 
mission of the press, which is to inform, interpret, and criticize.' Another paper, the 
Minneapolis Tribune, stated that 'If our government acts foolishly, slothfully, or otherwise 
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unwisely, we may find ourselves propelled into a global, nuclear war. The only way our 
citizens can keep an eye on their officials in this life-and-death issue is through alert, 
responsible news reporting'. 
14
 
 And so the press pointed towards the government, but the press also had itself  to 
blame according to some journalists. Many journalists were aware of the fact that in a conflict 
such as the Cold War, some things should remain a secret. In the case of the Bay of Pigs 
however, there was no secret to be kept since 'it was about as secret as opening day at Yankee 
Stadium', according to journalist James Reston. He later added that the press 'said too little' 
and that they had 'very little to say about the morality, legality or practicality of the Cuban 
adventure when there was still time to stop it.' The entire crisis had shown that journalism was 
being kept in check by the government which was pushing newspapers to only publish 
information that wouldn't harm their own country. The government was being secretive, the 
journalists weren't critical enough, and the end result was that the people didn't get the 
information that they deserved because of the Cold War-national security mentality that was 
all present throughout U.S. media.
15
 
 This was also the case with the situation in Vietnam prior to the escalation in 1963. 
Although it was logical that the administration tried to keep military operations, technology 
and intelligence a secret, its main strategy concerning Vietnam was to play it down. It was not 
going to ignore the complaints of the media, but it would try and make it seem as if nothing 
was going on in Vietnam. This was important for several reasons. Firstly, the administration 
wanted to make it seem as if it was complying with the Geneva agreement, an agreement 
which was set up to keep foreign military powers out of the Vietnam conflict. Secondly, 
Kennedy was afraid of public opinion. He was well aware of the power of U.S. journalism 
which was partly responsible for his rise to fame. The last thing he wanted was a piece on the 
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front page of the New York Times on the growing number of Americans getting involved in 
the conflict. This had a lot to do with the Korean War, a war in which the media wasn't as 
active as it would be during the Vietnam War, but nevertheless the majority of the public in 
the U.S. felt that the government had made a mistake in getting involved in Korea.
16
 The 
Kennedy administration feared that another limited land war in Asia would lead to the 
downfall of his administration and would give the Right a free passage to take control of 
Washington D.C.. 
17
 
 And so Kennedy would try to keep the media satisfied by keeping the White House 
open for (most) journalists and giving them all the answers they wanted. But this 'openness' 
did not mean that the media, and therefore the public, was getting the truth. A prime example 
of this is the Taylor-Rostow mission during which General Taylor led an investigation on the 
American support for the South-Vietnamese troops. The conclusion from Taylor was that 
ground combat troops from the U.S. were necessary if they wanted to succeed and that it 
would be better to send them as soon as possible. But during and after General Taylor's 
mission there was not a single article which discussed this conclusion as it was kept behind 
closed doors. The media and the public got a different story. The New York Times reported: 
"Military leaders at the Pentagon, no less than General Taylor himself, are understood to be 
reluctant to send organized U.S. combat units into Southeast Asia. [...] General Taylor 
declined to speak for the president, but declared: 'Any American would be reluctant to use 
troops unless absolutely necessary.'"
18
 One month later, when Taylor had returned from 
Vietnam, the New York Times yet again asked the General, who was in favor of sending 
ground troops to South Vietnam, whether he would recommend to send more troops: "The 
General declined to comment directly. [...] However, when General Taylor was reminded at 
the airport that his remarks before leaving Saigon had been interpreted as meaning that Ngo 
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Dinh Diem's problem was not manpower, the General replied: 'That is correct. It is a populous 
country.' Officials said it was correct to infer from this that General Taylor did not look 
favorably on the sending of U.S. combat troops at this time [...]  there would be considerable 
surprise here if General Taylor recommended such a move."
19
 
 Behind the scenes, Taylor and Kennedy were not on the same page. Taylor was in 
favor of sending ground troops as fast as possible whereas Kennedy had several problems. 
Firstly, he didn't want to look weak by not fighting Communism. And secondly, he wanted to 
avoid having his own Korea war which would certainly hurt public support for his 
administration. But despite this disagreement the media failed to report it.. Amongst them was 
David Halberstam's employer, the New York Times, which reported the following on 
Kennedy's press conference a couple days later which announced that several hundred 
specialists would be sent to aid the South-Vietnamese army:  
 
"President Kennedy has decided on the measures that the U.S. is prepared to take to 
strengthen South Vietnam against attack by the Communists. The measures [...] 
closely followed the recommendations made by General Maxwell D. Taylor, the 
President's military advisor. The U.S. plans do not include the dispatching of combat 
units at this time. They call for sending several hundred specialists. [...] The plans also 
call for fairly large-scale shipments of aircraft and other special equipment. Officials 
emphasized that the President [...] had not foreclosed the possibility of sending ground 
or air combat units if the situation deteriorated drastically. The President, it was said, 
does not wish to bind himself into a "never position. However, the President and 
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General Taylor agreed, according to reliable information available here, that the 
South-Vietnamese government is capable of turning back the Communist threat."
20
 
 
 This offers a prime example of the U.S. Government managing the news. It wanted to 
show the public that the entire administration was on the same page and at the same time 
make it seem as if extensive involvement of ground combat troops wasn't going to be a 
legitimate option. The media didn't doubt this and according to Hallin, the journalists were 
being naïve in their reports on General Taylor: "It is interesting to note that reporters often 
missed or ignored pointedly evasive answers by Taylor that seemed to hint strongly that there 
was a disagreement in the administration."
21
 This is especially true for the article cited on the 
previous page, "Taylor Cautious on G.I.'s for Asia", in which Taylor refuses to speak for the 
President - which shouldn't be an issue if they were in full agreement - and gives a rather 
general answer instead of really answering the question that was asked. Whether it was due to 
laziness, or fear of the Kennedy administration retaliating against reporters, is difficult to tell. 
But it is clear that already at that time there was a tense relationship between the media and 
the White House. 
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Chapter 2 
Conservative criticism of David Halberstam and the 
media bias 
 
'I've never seen anything to match the way they [American officials in Saigon] hate you.' 
 
- U.S. Public Advisor John Mecklin in conversation with David Halberstam in July 
1963. 
22
 
 
 David Halberstam arrived in Vietnam in 1962. It was a new experience for him and for 
many of his colleagues such as Ed Sheehan and Peter Arnett since they had never been in a 
situation like this. Halberstam referred to himself and his colleagues as 'the privileged few' 
and called Vietnam 'a very special assignment.'
23
 Halberstam had asked the New York Times 
in 1961 if he could cover the Vietnam War because "I was tired of the Congo, tired of hearing 
UN spokesmen claim they controlled areas they obviously did not control; tired of hearing the 
UN say before each major meeting that Tshombe (Congolese politician) could be trusted, and 
that it was the people around him - the Belgians and Munongo - who were causing all the 
trouble."
24
 
 In some way, the Vietnam War started off on exactly the same footing, with the U.S. 
government officials claiming that the situation was under control when it was not.  But what 
made this conflict different for Halberstam, and more interesting than the Congo, was the fact 
that this was a war in which America was beginning to fully commit itself to the cause and 
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where a reporter was easily able to gather information from the troops that were being 
deployed, something he couldn't do that easily in the Congo where there was an army with a 
huge variety of nationalities.  
 Central to the reporting of Halberstam and his colleagues in Vietnam is the 
conservative criticism that fell down on them as they were sending out their reports to their 
respective editors. Halberstam was among those singled out by conservative journalists such 
as Joe Alsop who claimed that these journalists were betraying their country with their 
sensationalist reporting. Prior to the Vietnam War, journalists were not being critical enough, 
such was the critique from academics such as Daniel Hallin. But now that the conflict was 
escalating, journalists were becoming - according to conservatives - too critical with regards 
to government policy in Vietnam.    
 In 1962, when Halberstam first entered Vietnam, there was no such criticism 
whatsoever. In fact, Halberstam wasn't critical at all when he first reported on the Vietnam 
War. He subscribed to the domino theory, a fear that communism would spread like an 
epidemic, and added that he saw Vietnam as vital to the security of South Asia: 'If the 
Vietnamese, who are perhaps the toughest people in Southeast Asia, fell to the Communists, 
the pressure on other shaky new nations would be intolerable.'
25
  
 An explanation for Halberstam's support for U.S. policy during the beginning of the 
Vietnam conflict can be found in how the American authorities treated him in Vietnam. 
Halberstam's predecessor at the New York Times, Homer Bigart, had been very vocal about 
how the Vietnam conflict wasn't going anywhere. When Bigart left, government officials tried 
to get Halberstam on their side by continuously praising his work.  However, this only had a 
short effect, as Halberstam had been receiving warnings from Homer Bigart himself who told 
him that the authorities were trying "to silence the few honest Americans who will level with 
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correspondents."
26
 Another example occurred during  a dinner that he had with colleague 
Jacques Nevard and an American official. During this meeting the official had given both of 
them lots of information, and Halberstam was very pleased with this. Afterwards, Nevard 
alerted Halberstam to the fact that this had been the first time that he had gotten so much 
information from an American source: "It's the first time he's ever told me anything. They're 
making a play for you [David] [...] and they're very, very glad that Homer [Bigart] is gone."
27
 
Halberstam slowly started to become more critical once he got settled in Saigon and found out 
that the authorities were indeed trying to praise all the new young journalists, just to make 
sure that they were reporting more positively than their 'grumpy' predecessors. For him and 
his colleagues, the circumstances under which they had to do their work were harsh. They 
were stuck in small, hot offices and relied on information coming from wire services. This 
was less than ideal, also because the reports that they made wouldn't arrive in the U.S. at the 
time that it was finished. It would usually take a few days before it could be posted. This 
made it more difficult for journalists like Halberstam to write reports that weren't outdated. 
On top of that, they weren't getting any help from the U.S. government, which was trying to 
control the reports that came out of Vietnam.
28
 
 Ironically, it was Joe Alsop, one of the conservative journalists who would become 
one of Halberstam's most prominent critics, who was largely responsible for Kennedy's new 
stance on the relation with the media in Vietnam. Alsop was one of the biggest supporters of 
South Vietnam's president at that time, Ngo Dinh Diem, and in a column he wrote that 
Kennedy wasn't being supportive enough and that South Vietnam was under enormous 
pressure because of it.
29
 Alsop got this information from Diem personally, and the U.S. 
Ambassador in South Vietnam was not amused that American journalists were now getting to 
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discover the 'ins and outs' of this conflict. Something had to be done, according to 
Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow.
30
 
 The Kennedy administration quickly decided to use a new strategy.  Diem was in total 
control of the Southern Vietnamese press, and he believed that the U.S. would use the same 
strategies to control the American journalists. Therefore, whenever an American journalist 
like Halberstam published something that was critical of his government, he accused the 
Americans of not supporting him on purpose. John Mecklin, who was the chief of the United 
States Information Agency, said that it was becoming 'unpatriotic for a newsman to use an 
adjective that displeased Mme. Nhu.' 
31
(Mme. Nhu was the wife of Diem's brother, and a 
highly influential figure in the South Vietnamese government).  
 Journalists such as David Halberstam were accused of being unpatriotic. Was this a 
fair accusation? When looking at the accounts of someone like David Halberstam, this 
accusation seems exaggerated. Halberstam joined the troops in the field and while being there 
he listened to everything that the soldiers had to say. Simply put, he was just doing his job. 
The U.S. was getting more and more involved in Vietnam and the national news organizations 
wanted an explanation for this involvement. They wanted their journalists in Vietnam to write 
more stories, to provide more news and to make sure that their employees had the best 
information that they could possibly get. But since the U.S. government wasn't giving 
Halberstam and his colleagues any valuable information, the only solution was to join the 
troops in the jungle: "How do you add up thirty minor engagements each day, almost all of 
them in places you've never been to, and with no substantive information to cast light on the 
significance of the situation? It was very quickly obvious to me that the story could not be 
covered from Saigon briefing rooms, despite all the multicolored arrows on the maps."
32
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 And so Halberstam 'joined' the ARVN Seventh Division in South Saigon. He followed 
the division into combat and translated its experiences before he put them on paper. 
Halberstam couldn't help but notice that these troops were getting more and more frustrated: 
"Americans are bothered by the Vietnamese failure to patrol [and] the lack of urgency in the 
fight against a quick and elusive enemy. There is some feeling on the part of the Americans in 
the field that, despite all the talk of counter-guerrilla tactics, the real battle has yet to be 
joined."
33
 In the very same article, Halberstam added that 'it should be reported, that there is 
considerably less optimism out in the field than in Washington or in Saigon and that the closer 
one gets to the actual contract level of this war, the further one gets from the official 
optimism.”34 
 As to be expected, the South Vietnamese government was not amused with reports 
such as these. Together with the Kennedy administration it undertook measures to decrease 
their influence. The U.S. government was mainly trying to keep reporters out of combat 
situations whereas the South Vietnamese government was constantly trying to sabotage the 
'unpatriotic' reporters. If all of this didn't work, reporters were eventually forced to leave the 
country. Such was the fate of two of Halberstam's colleagues, Francois Sully (Newsweek) and 
James Robinson (NBC). Sully was punished for an article that was too critical of Mme. Nhu 
while Robinson was punished because NBC was particularly seen as a news outlet that had a 
predominantly negative influence on the war effort. 
35
  
According to Halberstam, these expulsions were taken very seriously by American 
colleagues. For him, it was a clear signal that he shouldn't write anything that would displease 
the Diem administration. Halberstam said that it all came down to a fine line on which a 
journalist had to walk. On one hand, he had to write newsworthy material, but it should not be 
                                                          
33
 David Halberstam, 'U.S. Deeply Involved in the Uncertain Struggle for Vietnam', New York Times, October 21, 
1962, p.3. 
34
 Halberstam, 'U.S. Deeply Involved.' 
35
 Mecklin, 132-138. 
21 
 
too critical because it was obvious that the present rulers - Diem and the U.S. government - 
were having none of it. Apart from Sully and Robinson, most reporters were allowed to stay, 
but they were continuously watched and hindered during their work. Meanwhile, journalists 
such as Joe Alsop, Richard Tresgakis, and Howard Sochurek (Time-Life) were given special 
treatment. It should be no surprise why these journalists were being helped: they were all 
supporters of Diem. Alsop especially, was highly regarded by the Diem, who saw him as the 
only American journalist that he could trust. In return, Alsop always got the best assignments 
when the Americans were going into combat situations. Because of all these benefits, it 
shouldn't be a surprise that Alsop always remained positive  about American intervention in 
Vietnam and that he was very critical of someone like Halberstam.  Therefore, the American 
and South Vietnamese authorities tried to make Halberstam's job as difficult as they possibly 
could without resorting to  illegal measures and outright censorship.
36
 
 Some U.S. officials disliked reporters such as Halberstam and didn't keep it to 
themselves: "The American commitment had been badly hampered by irresponsible, 
astigmatic and sensationalized reporting."
37
 Those were the words of General Earle Wheeler 
in 1963. He felt, just like Diem and his family did, that it was the press that was undermining 
their effort in Vietnam.  All of a sudden the Vietcong wasn't the only enemy that they were 
dealing with, but they also began to see these critical reporters as enemies of the war effort.  
 A journalist who felt the same way as General Earle Wheeler was Robert Elegant, a 
British-American journalist who had been a reporter in Vietnam for the Los Angeles Times. In 
1981, he wrote an article called 'How to lose a war: the press and Vietnam' in which he 
heavily criticizes the U.S. press for (sometimes unconsciously) sabotaging the American war 
effort in Vietnam. One of the points Elegant makes is that U.S. correspondents were not 
thinking outside the box, they were only talking to each other and therefore they started 
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sharing similar views on the conflict. With regards to Halberstam, one can point to the 
warnings he had been receiving from predecessor Homer Bigart before he went to Vietnam. 
Bigart was one of the main critics of U.S. policy in Vietnam, and it could very well be that 
Halberstam was influenced by his views and his articles. However, looking back at his first 
weeks in Vietnam, his tone was nowhere as critical as that of Bigart, and it wasn't until the 
first burning of a Buddhist monk that he started to become more critical in the pieces that he 
wrote. Another point of criticism lies in the fact that, according to Elegant, many reporters 
were seeking the approval of their editors.
38
 When looking at Halberstam's relation with the 
editors at the New York Times, this doesn't seem to be the case. Halberstam himself explains 
in The Powers that be that he was fully aware of the influence that he had as he was writing 
for one of the biggest newspapers in the country.  He aggressively pursued interesting stories, 
while trying to avoid getting expelled from the country. This infuriated president Kennedy, 
especially since Halberstam had such good connections. Through these connections, he was 
seemingly getting information at a faster rate than the U.S. embassy itself. So in a way it 
wasn't just the critical reporting that was bothering the administration, but also the freedom 
and power that someone like Halberstam had to gather any kind of information that he wanted 
to. But whereas Kennedy's administration clearly disliked Halberstam, the latter was also 
making his editor at the New York Times quite nervous. An excerpt from a conversation 
between Kennedy and New York Times-publisher Arthur Sulzberger is a perfect example of 
Kennedy's dislike for Halberstam: 
 
'"What do you think of your young man [Halberstam] in Saigon?" Kennedy began. 
"We like him fine," Sulzberger said, somewhat taken aback. 
"You don't think he's too close to the story?" The President asked. 
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"No", said Sulzberger. 
"You weren't," suggested the President, "thinking of transferring him to Paris or 
Rome?" 
"No", said the publisher of the Times, he had no such plans.'
39
 
 
 However, Sulzberger and the New York Times were nervous about Halberstam's 
reporting. In fact, according to Halberstam, the paper didn't like the fact that their main 
reporter could be portrayed as someone who was soft on Communism. After all, it was a war 
being waged against Communism and one of the most popular claims that conservatives made 
was that reporters such as Halberstam were supporting Communism through their critical 
reporting. Therefore the paper did advise Halberstam to be more balanced in his reporting and 
that it would be wise to add some quotes from the administration which were positive. That 
way the paper couldn't be portrayed as an institution that was soft on Communism during the 
Cold War itself. Still, as Halberstam said, he saw it as a balancing act in which he was 
constantly trying to make newsworthy reports without angering too much people. That way 
his editors would be happy and the president would maybe dislike him a little less. But it was 
no secret that Halberstam was one of the most disliked journalists in Washington during his 
stay in Vietnam.
40
 
 In The Powers That Be, Halberstam claimed that the Kennedy administration waged a 
public relations war rather than an actual war. He described how both the Kennedy and the 
Johnson administration tried to convince the public that journalists such as himself were 
untrustworthy reporters. They tried to force the military into not leaking any negative reports 
to  journalists, but this proved an impossible task. Even though the higher ranked officials 
stuck to a more positive story, the regular soldier expressed his frustration to men like 
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Halberstam and Neil Sheehan. And so the White House , according to Halberstam himself, 
started to attack the journalists on a personal level. Rumors were being spread which said that 
most of the journalists didn't go into battle at all and that they drank too much which made 
their reports even more negative. Reporters were also portrayed as communist sympathizers.  
It was whispered that the reporters lacked experience of war and therefore could not report it 
accurately.  Simply put, the administration portrayed journalists such as Halberstam as 
unpatriotic weaklings who didn't understand the conflict that they were reporting. It put 
pressure on the military itself not spread any stories that could undermine the war effort.  
 With the number of soldiers reaching a number of 200,000 during the Johnson 
administration, this proved an impossible story to control. However, the White House was 
probably relieved when Halberstam left Vietnam.  Reporters who met President Johnson 
before being assigned to Vietnam were regularly being told 'not to be like Halberstam and 
Sheehan, they're traitors to the country.'
41
 It was safe to say that journalists such as 
Halberstam were heavily disliked amongst U.S. officials. U.S. Public Advisor John Mecklin 
even recalls a scene where the officials in Saigon got word that an unnamed reporter almost 
got shot by the Vietcong, after which "a senior official snapped his fingers in disappointment, 
like a man who had missed a putt on the golf course. Everyone laughed."
42
 
 Even though Halberstam has never expressed regret for the role that he has played 
during the Vietnam war, Robert Elegant does show that some reporters have changed their 
opinion on the subject. He cites two reporters, one from Great Britain and one from Germany, 
who both feel 'ashamed' for their reporting during the conflict. Besides that, Elegant does 
rightfully point out that many reporters, Halberstam included, probably lacked detailed 
knowledge of the country's situation. Many journalists who came to Vietnam didn't have any 
experience with the country, and were asked to report on a complicated conflict in a country 
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unknown to most reporters. Still, Elegant's conclusion that many reporters were sympathizing 
with Hanoi because, more often than not, the American administration at times lied about 
tactical details of their mission, seems harsh. Halberstam, being a journalist, rightfully became 
suspicious of the U.S. administration when they found out that certain things were being 
hidden from them. But that doesn't automatically mean that they believed everything that 
came from Hanoi. Simply put, Elegant is seemingly connecting two cases with each other that 
don't necessarily have a connection with one another. In support of Halberstam, it should be 
noted though that Elegant's article is mainly critical of the impact of television, and doesn't 
talk about many newspaper reporters such as Sheehan, Halberstam or even Alsop. But the 
article does, rightfully, raise some questions on the role of the international media during the 
Vietnam conflict.
43
  
 However, these accusations don't all apply to Halberstam. He was one of the first 
young reporters who was in Vietnam when the conflict was rapidly changing, and therefore he 
(and also Sheehan and Karnow) more or less had the story for themselves. Once Halberstam 
left, many more young and up and coming reporters would head to Vietnam, and it is safe to 
say that some were definitely inspired by Halberstam's reports. One of these correspondents, 
John Sack, was a reporter for CBS in Madrid when he read a piece on Halberstam in Esquire. 
He was a friend of Halberstam, and after reading the article he suddenly felt an urge to come 
to Vietnam: "Of course I read that story about David, and that picture of him crossing a 
swamp with the hat on and turning back to look at the camera. A pang of nostalgia, maybe 
even jealousy, went through me, and I thought: 'I'm supposed to be there."
44
 Throughout the 
literature it is clear that David Halberstam had become quite the pioneer for new journalists 
coming to Vietnam, and in a way one could say that Elegant is right when saying that young 
reporters when to Vietnam with a prejudice. But Halberstam wasn't one of them, and if he did 
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go to Vietnam with a certain prejudice, it was one very different from those that came in the 
years after him.  
 Lastly, Daniel Hallin opposed the oppositional media thesis and claims that the 
majority of journalists in Vietnam, including Halberstam, always stayed true to their ideology 
of objective journalism. The tone did become more critical as the war went on, and especially 
the Tet offensive sparked an increase in critical reports. However, this happened almost four 
years after Halberstam had left. So if these negative reports, which weren't deliberately 
critical according to Hallin, had a huge influence on war support, then one can point out that 
Halberstam's successors had more impact on the undermining of war support than he did. 
45
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Chapter 3 
The Burning Monk and the fall of Diem 
 
‘We all personalized the struggle. But Halberstam personalized it more than anyone else.' 
 
- Neil Sheehan, journalist for United Press International 
 
 One of the first big stories that Halberstam covered was the Buddhist crisis in 1963, a 
crisis that led to the downfall of the Diem regime. He was one of the first reporters at the 
scene of the first burning monk. On June 11, 1963, Halberstam was alerted by one of his 
Vietnamese sources that he should quickly get out of bed and go to a demonstration taking 
place in the city centre of Saigon. At first, he didn't think that something special was going on, 
but he soon saw a monk in the middle of the street, surrounded by flames and quietly burning 
to death. The U.S. government had tried at all times to put Diem in a positive light. But this 
scene convinced Halberstam that the regime was one of repression; it undermined American 
support for Diem.
46
 But if one looks at the reporting on the Buddhist crisis it becomes 
apparent that Diem made several crucial mistakes and that the press corps had nothing to do 
with it. 
 According to Halberstam, the crisis had already begun before the scene of the burning 
monk. In May 1963, Buddhists were protesting because the government forbade them to use 
religious flags during a parade. Diem's response was fierce, as he ordered his troops to shoot 
at the demonstrators, killing several protesters.  What followed was a mass-protest, and 
Halberstam was appalled by Diem's handling of the crisis: "Observing the government during 
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these four months was like watching a government trying to commit suicide." 
47
 Then the 
burning monk scene took place on a city centre in Saigon, and as said before, it became an 
event which made Halberstam even more critical of the conflict. The gap between the 
American press and the local officials was growing wider and wider as the South-Vietnamese 
government was, as Halberstam put it, going into self-destruct mode by harassing the 
Buddhist groups. 
 According to John Mecklin, who was the U.S. Public Affairs Officer from 1962 till 
1964, the South-Vietnamese government was wrong in thinking that these protests were being 
exaggerated by the U.S. press corps. Although he did believe that reporters such as 
Halberstam had a huge grievance towards Diem, and that they revelled in his mistakes, they 
did nothing wrong in reporting the Buddhist crisis. Mecklin admitted that it was Diem's own 
fault that the press used this unrest to show how inadequate his government was.
48
 
 Nevertheless, the anger of Diem and Mme. Nhu towards reporters such as Halberstam 
and Neil Sheehan continued to grow. Even though they didn't directly try to bring down Diem 
and his government, these reporters indirectly kept the Buddhist protests alive. In first 
instance, the Buddhists were trying to get the American government on their side. However, 
they soon found out that the Americans would stick by Diem's side and so they turned to the 
only other outlet that they could find: the journalists. Through them they could show the rest 
of the world what was going on and that is just what they did. Halberstam and others were 
pre-notified whenever a mass demonstration was being held and journalists would always be 
at these mass protests when they started. U.S. officials, Mecklin included, were left in the cold 
and didn't know anything about upcoming demonstrations.  
 All of a sudden, the journalists and Buddhists were gaining the upper hand in this 
crisis. As soon as the American officials started to notice this trend, they advised Diem to 
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issue an apology to the Buddhists  and to try and come to terms with them before things 
spiraled out of control. But Diem and Mme. Nhu would have none of it and they subsequently 
started their own media war by claiming that the burned monk was 'drugged' before he burned 
himself to death, and that the only useful thing the Buddhists had done for the country was "to 
barbecue a monk." Also, in a radio speech Diem declared that in an act of "concealing 
propaganda that sowed doubt about the goodwill of the government, a number of people got 
intoxicated and caused an undeserved death that made me very sorry."
49
 Diem later claimed 
that the burning monk had been bribed by Malcolm Browne and AP just so that he could take 
an amazing photo.
50
 However, this didn't sound trustworthy at all, since Mme. Nhu would 
later add that "if they burn 30 women, we will go ahead and clap our hands. We cannot be 
responsible for their madness."
51
  
The protests had already gotten out of hand and all the reports and accusations from 
Diem just made matters worse. Slowly, the anger from Diem towards journalists turned into 
actual physical altercations. During a Buddhist protest on July 7, Halberstam and several other 
reporters were watching the protests unfold in Saigon. Then out of nowhere, Malcolm Browne 
and Peter Arnett were being surrounded by a mob and one of Browne's cameras was smashed 
during the altercation that followed. In a New York Times Article on July 8, Halberstam wrote: 
"Moments later (after Browne and Arnett had been pushed) the secret policemen began 
pushing reporters and trying to seize the photographers cameras. [...] William Trueheart, 
charge d'arraires in the U.S. Embassy, said that the embassy had been told by the Vietnamese 
that a few people 'lost their heads.'"
52
  Halberstam, who was perhaps the tallest and most 
physically imposing of the reporters, intervened and prevented his colleagues from being hurt. 
According to Neil Sheehan, who was also present and being provoked, "Halberstam charged 
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with a bellow before they had an opportunity to hurt Arnett seriously, he knocked and tossed 
the lightly built Vietnamese aside and stood over Arnett, his grizzly-bear shoulders hunched 
and his great fists poised, yelling: 'Get back, get back you sons of bitches, or I'll beat the shit 
out of you!'"
53
 Browne and Arnett both were forced to go to a police station the next day and 
were almost convicted of assaulting innocent bystanders if it wasn't for the fact that they were 
still relying on the U.S. for its assistance during this military conflict. But all of a sudden, 
Diem and his officials seemed more busy fighting the press than they were fighting the 
Vietcong.
54
 
 During the altercation in July, Halberstam had been able to defend himself, but soon 
afterwards Diem and Mme. Nhu were starting to become even more paranoid. They saw the 
American press, or at least a big part of it, as the enemy. On August 21, 1963, Halberstam 
sought refuge at the office of an American official (John Mecklin). Together with Neal 
Sheehan, he had gotten word that Mme. Nhu had ordered a group of men to assault the places 
that they were staying at, and that they were even on her death list. Since they both knew how 
paranoid and desperate the Diem administration had become, they rushed off to Mecklin who 
offered to let them hide in his office for the next 3 weeks. As an American official, Mecklin 
was well aware that these threats could very well be true and he wanted to avoid the drama 
that he had experienced during the arrest of Arnett and Browne.
55
 As Mecklin himself said, 
these journalists didn't do anything wrong. He didn't agree with their reporting before the 
Buddhist crisis, and acknowledged that some reporters seemed to be out there to deliberately 
hurt the U.S. cause (he didn't give any names, so whether he included Halberstam in this 
group is unclear), but during the Buddhist crisis their reporting was undeniably unbiased. He 
made it very clear that it was the Diem administration that was destroying itself  and that 
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people like Halberstam were simply watching it unravel. Diem and Mme. Nhu were so 
desperate to hold onto power that they wanted to find another scapegoat, and this became the 
American press. 
 In the chaos that ensued, Halberstam suddenly had two fronts that he needed to cover: 
firstly,  he was still asked to watch military developments; secondly, the Buddhist crisis added 
a political element that was equally interesting.  This had a lot to do with Halberstam's 
background as a reporter in Mississippi and in Nashville, Tennessee, where he was a reporter 
in a time when the American Civil Rights movement was struggling for power in the Deep 
South. The Buddhist crisis reminded him very much of the crisis that had been present in the 
southern part of the U.S. And so Halberstam covered the entire crisis with great interest and 
thanks to his Buddhist sources he was always able to get all the information about future 
protests and demonstrations. He was also able to place everything into a logical context for 
his readers because the Buddhists would give him terrific information on the background of 
the political conflict. The Buddhists wanted to show the world what was going on, and 
reporters like Halberstam, who remembered scenes like this from the past in Mississippi and 
Tennessee, reported it with great interest as the conflict was entering a new stage. 
56
 
 In all this turmoil it is fair to ask whether the Buddhists themselves were deliberately 
manipulating the U.S. press corps. Halberstam himself acknowledged that the Buddhists were 
very well aware of the influence that the journalists had. "They did not understand the 
function of a free press, but they quickly sensed that it could be used and that it gave them 
some protection." In other words, despite the fact that they didn't grasp the concept of 
something as 'objective journalism', they did feel like they had a new ally in their battle 
against Diem. But if they Buddhists were manipulating the journalists, then Diem was 
certainly doing the same. Halberstam also explains how, on several occasions, policemen 
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would leave Buddhists alone once the press arrived. In a way it became a cat and mouse game 
with the press stuck in the middle. 
57
 
 This conflict expanded Halberstam's connections in Vietnam, up to the point where he 
was much better informed than American officials, especially when it came to the political 
conflict. U.S. officials were aware of the problems and were pressuring Diem to 'fix it.' Still, 
their connections weren't as good as those of Halberstam or Sheehan, who had inside 
information which they acquired from the Buddhist groups. A prime example of this can be 
found on August 21, 1963, when the Diem administration prepared series of attacks on 
Buddhist shrines which became to be known as the Xa Loi raid. The U.S. officials had already 
been insisting for quite some time that Diem would be wise to put the conflict to an end. 
Instead, he fired back and whereas Halberstam knew all about it, the U.S. administration was 
left in disbelief when they got the word from Halberstam and his colleague Neil Sheehan that 
these attacks were about to take place. One of the officials became angry with the two 
reporters and asked them "Why didn't you tell us?". All of a sudden Halberstam himself 
started to realize just how well-informed he had gotten and he couldn't believe that the U.S. 
administration had no clue about the Xa Loi raid taking place that day. 
58
 
 Two days later, Halberstam put together a story which proved that Diem’s own special 
forces, not the Vietnamese army, had initiated the Xa Loi raid.
59
 Despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese authorities were making it more and more difficult for him to do his job, he was 
still hopeful that his story would make it to New York. Because of the heavy censorship and 
the fact that he was still reporting from an underdeveloped country, Halberstam often didn't 
know how his story would be published. But two days later word had reached Saigon that 
Halberstam's article had been published on the front page of the New York Times. Halberstam, 
who was in an office with Sheehan and some other journalists, was applauded by several 
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colleagues; Charles Mohr (Time) said that Halberstam and Sheehan were "the first reporters 
I've ever known who scooped the State Department by four days." 
60
 Halberstam continued to 
get better information than the majority of the U.S. officials and his hard work was beginning 
to become the end for Diem, in whom the American administration was losing faith. Also in 
Vietnam, Halberstam sensed that Americans were feeling less and less enthusiastic in 
supporting the government of Diem. Despite their loyalty and their willingness to battle 
communism, one American advisor said it was simply a matter of time: "they just aren't going 
to want to keep taking risks for a Nhu government." Another American pointed out the irony 
of the situation in which both Americans and Vietnamese found themselves: "When a young 
Vietnamese and a young American get on well together, one thing they have in common is 
that neither likes his own country's policy."
61
 
 At the beginning of the Vietnam conflict, Halberstam described himself as one of the 
most hated reporters in Vietnam. But as Diem created a state filled with chaos and fear, the 
U.S. officials began to shift their annoyance towards Diem himself, and not so much the 
reporters. Diem and Mme. Nhu were trying to scare away journalists such as Halberstam and 
even considered removing them by force. Eventually, the Kennedy administration couldn't 
ignore the chaos that Diem was creating. Kennedy had become frustrated with Diem's 
unwillingness to change his course and eventually there was no turning back. The CIA also 
agreed and acknowledged that Vietnam was "at serious risk of being lost over the course of 
time" as long as Diem remained in charge. After months of talks and negotiations between 
Kennedy and his administration, the trigger was pulled on November 1, 1963. Diem was 
killed during a coup in the presidential palace, and a change of course was supposedly 
imminent.
62
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According to Halberstam this turn of events wasn't a great surprise, as he had already 
predicted in late August that there would "either be a coup d'etat, [...] or a Nhu coup, which 
would include an attempt to crush the Buddhist movement." At one point Halberstam had 
even been approached by a Vietnamese source who happened to be in a plot involving young 
Vietnamese officers. Halberstam, who was quite surprised, would be given inside access to 
the story, but would also have to flee the country if things went wrong. Halberstam had 
decided that it was worth the risk, but eventually the contact faded.  
63
 Still, it was clear to him 
that something was about to happen, and eventually, on November 10, the expected coup took 
place. For Halberstam, it meant that he and his colleagues would no longer have to fear the 
censorship of Diem's administration, and for a moment it seemed as if both the press and the 
government were about to become partners. In fact, Halberstam, who was preparing to leave 
Vietnam at the end of 1963, said that the removal of Diem made it a lot easier to work in 
Vietnam as a journalist: "For once, the job of a reporter in Vietnam was easy."
64
 
 In terms of media bias, it is telling that even an U.S. official such as John Mecklin was 
ready to admit that David Halberstam wasn't there to promote his own agenda. During the 
Buddhist crisis the administration of Diem had handled the entire situation so poorly that the 
reporters could hardly be blamed. They simply reported what they saw, and what one would 
see wasn't pretty. Nevertheless, Joe Alsop and Marguerite Higgins, two conservative 
journalists, remained critical of Halberstam. And not every editor was  pleased with the work 
that Halberstam was publishing in the New York Times.  
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Chapter 4 
Halberstam in comparison with his colleagues & 
pressure from his editors 
 
"Reporters here would like to see us lose the war to prove they're right" 
 
- Marguerite Higgins, journalist for the New York Herald Tribune 
 
 Alsop and Higgins completely disagreed with the reports that Halberstam wrote.  
Higgins used the classic argument that journalists such as Halberstam engaged in negative 
reporting in order to advance their careers.  Alsop and Higgins both remained on the side of 
the government no matter what happened. Whereas Halberstam himself had made a shift after 
certain events occurred in Vietnam, Alsop and Higgins were one of a few who were 
determined to prove that the U.S. government was doing the right thing. Alsop, during the 
Buddhist crisis and the subsequent fall of Diem, had already criticized Halberstam for starting 
a 'reportorial crusade'. He claimed that journalists such as Halberstam were ignoring 'the 
majority of Americans who admire the Vietnamese as fighters.' According to Alsop, only 1 
out 10 U.S. officers had a negative view on the Vietnamese troops
65
   
 Alsop was a Washington Post columnist who had strong ties to president John F. 
Kennedy. He was considered one of Kennedy’s best friends and in return it meant that Alsop 
was never too critical of Kennedy. What did seem strange is that Alsop became critical of 
Diem when the latter was in  danger of losing power. Just as he had a close relationship with 
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Kennedy, Alsop was also very close to Diem; in fact, the South-Vietnamese president made it 
known that he was only able to trust one American journalist, and this journalist was Joe 
Alsop. With these relationships came special treatment.  Alsop claimed that Halberstam had 
picked a side and that he would do anything to make sure that the other side lost, but Alsop 
did exactly the same. Even when he was critical of the U.S., he was still supportive of the 
paranoid Diem who had begun to physically intimidate other journalists. 
 In the case of Marguerite Higgins it also seems that there was a good reason for her to 
become hostile of those who were critical of the U.S. government. In the case of Higgins, it 
wasn't a close relationship with Diem or Kennedy, but rather the fact that was been married to 
a soldier, Lieutenant General William Evans Hall.
66
 This seems to be a rather logical 
explanation of the fact why she always remained positive about the U.S. effort in Vietnam and 
continued to criticize journalists like Halberstam who she felt were trying to undermine the 
war effort.    
 Editors regarded Alsop and Higgins as two very experienced journalists.  Both of them 
had earned their stripes; Higgins had won a Pulitzer prize for her work during the Korea War. 
As a result, some editors at the New York Times started to get worried and were afraid that 
Halberstam was going on a pro-communist crusade that would eventually bring down morale 
in the U.S. amongst the readers. The editors didn't mind that reporters were sometimes critical 
of the government, as they valued their political independence.  However, some felt that 
Halberstam's course was too extreme. Despite his great journalistic attributes, he didn't have a 
lot of experience, and the fact that someone as experienced and respected as Marguerite 
Higgins was saying the exact opposite worried the paper.
67
 It was a time in which tensions 
between editors and reporters were rising throughout the journalistic landscape. At Time 
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magazine for example, two reporters, Charles Mohr and Mert Perry, resigned after their 
editors had published a story which criticized the negative reporting from Saigon. Their own 
critical stories had already been shot down on several occasions as the editors had made it 
clear that they were trying to support Diem in any way that they could; negative reporting 
wouldn't be beneficial and would hurt the cause. It is yet another example of a newspaper 
and/or magazine which was under the impression that it could make the difference between 
winning and losing in this conflict. 
68
 A few weeks after Mohr and Perry resigned, Time 
magazine took back some of the harsh words that it had expressed when talking about 
journalists like Halberstam, Sheehan and even their own reporters: "[...] today telling the truth 
about the Saigon press corps is a difficult job."
69
 Simply said, Time magazine acknowledged 
that it didn't know all the details about the situation in Saigon and that its own report was 
based on fears, rumors, and a political agenda. 
 Tensions rose at the headquarters of the New York Times as well as editors started to 
doubt Halberstam. They informed him of Higgins' reports and asked him if he could fact 
check his reports more carefully to make sure they were accurate.  Halberstam was not 
amused, he had already been a reporter in Saigon for quite some time and he felt insulted that 
his bosses, after all this time, doubted his competence. In a conversation with one of his 
editors, Nathaniel Gerstenzang, Halberstam voiced his complaint: "Gerstenzang, if you 
mention that woman's name (Higgins) to me one more time I will resign repeat resign and I 
mean it repeat mean it." After a few tirades from Halberstam, the New York Times editors 
stopped complaining to him directly, but the doubts remained. Still, they felt he was too 
talented to transfer him out of Saigon directly and that it wouldn't look good for the paper if 
they were to fire a reporter who was critical. “Scotty” Reston, who had hired Halberstam at 
the Times, couldn't believe how often they  doubted and sometimes spiked Halberstam’s 
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reports.  But despite Reston's efforts, the relationship between Halberstam and the New York 
Times was going downhill. Some editors were also getting tired of Halberstam's behavior. He 
was typically more direct and straightforward in terms of words and actions than many 
colleagues and unsurprisingly this didn't sit well with everyone. Whereas other journalists, 
such as his friend Neil Sheehan, tried to stay polite at all times and had a very different 
character, Halberstam made it known when he didn't like someone, even if that someone was 
an U.S. official. This made him beloved by some colleagues in Saigon, but hated by others.
70
 
 Halberstam, Sheehan and many others despised the work of Alsop and Higgins. They 
felt that they were simply puppets of from the U.S. government who were deliberately trying 
to make everything look better than it really was. The fact that they thought like this was not 
absurd.  The U.S. government was more or less urging senior journalists to visit Vietnam in 
the company of U.S. officials in order to see the conflict with their own eyes. Both Alsop and 
Higgins went on such trips and as said, they heavily criticized reports by Halberstam. What 
does seem odd in all of this is that Alsop, who was at first critical of Kennedy for not giving 
Diem enough support, would criticize Diem upon returning to Kennedy in private.
71
   
 This is yet another example of Alsop being a reporter who really believed that 
negative reports in the media would undermine the war effort. Alsop’s reporting reflected his 
close links to the Kennedy administration.  As the Dutch war reporter Arnold Karskens says: 
"A good journalist doesn't have any friends." 
72
 The fact that the U.S. treated reporters such as 
Higgins and Alsop as guests makes it seem as if they actually sponsored these trips to make 
young, inexperienced reporters such as Halberstam look bad. No one has been able to prove 
that the government in Washington actually paid and sponsored these trips deliberately to hurt 
the integrity of young, critical reporters. But it is pretty clear that they only urged a select 
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group of experienced reporters, with a background of positive reporting on Washington, to 
visit Vietnam.
73
 
 However, when taking a look at the literature written by other journalists at the time it 
becomes clear that Alsop and Higgins were 'lone wolves', in the world of U.S. journalism and 
in Saigon. Their views were not shared by many others. Most of Halberstam's colleagues 
shared his views. Peter Arnett, a journalist from New Zealand who worked for the Associated 
Press, called David Halberstam one of the most influential journalists in Vietnam. According 
to Arnett, Halberstam had the guts to go where others didn't dare to go and despite the heavy 
criticism that this reporting received, the editors back home finally began to realize that these 
reports weren't fiction. Arnett also experienced doubts, which mostly stemmed from the fact 
that he was inexperienced, and that the only ones who confirmed his story were other young 
and inexperienced journalists. Editors looked at these reporters critically to make sure they 
weren't copying one another.  But once their reports started to stack up, the editors began to 
realize that it was indeed a fact that the reports from U.S. officials weren't in line with actual 
events. Arnett also argues that Higgins’claim that many journalists wished to see the U.S. lose 
the war, was ludicrous. Reporters such as himself and Halberstam did not seek to harm the 
U.S.. In fact, he describes the situation in Saigon as one that got more tense once the conflict 
erupted. Just as in any branch of journalism, reporters were both colleagues and enemies at 
the same time. Everyone had their own sources and everyone protected these sources with the 
greatest care. Journalists always want to have a scoop and the situation in Vietnam was no 
different. Halberstam got the better of several other journalists on numerous occasions with 
his military analyses, but others such as Malcolm Browne, Arnett himself, Neil Sheehan and 
Ray Herndon also had their scoops. 
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 This last part is an important fact that many analyses of this subject seem to forget.  
Journalists tend to be people with reasonably large egos; they are not looking to make friends, 
they are out to be the first to get their hands on something newsworthy. David Halberstam 
was a young, enthusiastic reporter with a big future ahead of him and he was well aware of 
that fact. According to William Prochnau, others knew very well of Halberstam's reputation, 
and from the moment he arrived it was seemingly a showdown between him and Malcolm 
Browne. Browne had been there for a longer time and therefore had the better sources and the 
better stories. This frustrated Halberstam and he tried to get Browne to share some of his 
sources. Halberstam soon found out that it was every man for himself and that he would have 
to crack open this story on his own. According to Prochnau, Halberstam had to get used to the 
more competitive surroundings in Vietnam, especially since he was someone who enjoyed 
company. But eventually, Prochnau adds, Halberstam became more selfish as well, even 
though the literature depicts the Saigon press corps as a team. Although he was a social able 
person, Halberstam realized that one had to choose his own path in this jungle. There is no 
more telling example of Halberstam's selfishness than the scene in which Neil Sheehan, with 
whom he shared a desk, fell asleep while transcribing a story over the phone. Sheehan had 
been completely exhausted after he hadn't gotten any sleep the night before.  Despite the fact 
that he and Sheehan were quite close, Halberstam picked up the phone and took the story 
from Sheehan. 
75
 
 Editors were misled by experienced reporters such as Alsop and Higgins. But as the 
reports from Halberstam and his colleagues stacked up, they began to realize that there was 
indeed a different, more troubling, story. As James Reston said, the fact that Halberstam's 
reports were different from those of U.S. officials made them newsworthy. Still, doubts 
remained as experience seemingly played a huge role in the credibility process and that was 
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something that Halberstam didn't have. He had been active in the Congo for a few years but 
he was still vastly less experienced than people like Alsop. However, Halberstam overcame 
the inexperience and eventually set a high standard for his reports which led to very positive 
reviews from colleagues such as Neil Sheehan and Peter Arnett who admired his work and his 
no-nonsense attitude. It is this same attitude that gave him trouble at the Times, but it also 
made it possible for him to become one of the most influential personalities in Saigon. One 
who wasn't out there to see the U.S. lose, and who wasn't in Saigon to make friends and 
cooperate with anyone (something which came after the 'rejection' from Malcolm Browne). 
Halberstam was simply a young, motivated and hardworking reporter who tried to do his job 
the best way possible, and just like in many other influential professions, that automatically 
means that people will doubt and criticize you. 
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Chapter 5                                                                                  
America's  reaction to the supposed undermining of 
war support & Halberstam's explanation of the 
Vietnam conflict 
 
"I don't think it is fair to blame the messenger for the content of what he carries" 
 
- Peter Arnett, reporter for the Associated Press 
 
 Halberstam was one of the most polarizing reporters in Vietnam. In every piece of 
literature which discusses the Vietnam conflict and the influence of media, his name passes by 
on multiple pages. The U.S. officials in Saigon didn't like Halberstam that much; he knew too 
much and was saying too many things that would undermine support for the war. Was this 
fear realistic? When Halberstam arrived in Vietnam, Malcolm Browne, Francois Sully and 
Homer Bigart had already been in Vietnam for a year and were able to report on the U.S. 
increasing the amount of 'military advisers' and the fact that Americans were already getting 
killed in combat. Still, until the Buddhist crisis erupted, Kennedy succeeded in downplaying  
the conflict.   
 But not every journalist bought into this argument. Halberstam's predecessor, Homer 
Bigart, tried to make it clear to his readers that a war was in the making: "The United States is 
involved in a war in Vietnam. American Troops will stay until victory. That is what Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy last week. He called it 'war... in a very real sense of the word.' [...] 
43 
 
Actually the U.S. had been deeply involved in the fate of Vietnam since 1949."
76
 A few 
weeks later, Bigart added: "The United States, by massive and unqualified support of the 
regime of President Ngo Ding Diem, has helped arrest the spread of Communist insurgency in 
South Vietnam. But victory is remote. The issue remains in doubt because the Vietnamese 
President seems incapable of winning the loyalty of his people. [...] However, no decisive turn 
in the military struggle is expected this year. [...] No one who has seen the conditions of 
combat in South Vietnam would expect conventionally trained United States forces to fight 
any better against Communist guerillas than did the French in their seven years. [...] 
Americans may simply lack the endurance - and the motivation - to meet the unbelievably 
tough demands of jungle fighting."
77
 And also Halberstam's close friend, and colleague, Neil 
Sheehan, was very clear about the fact that America was waging a war, and not a very 
successful one: "'It was a miserable damn performance' was the way one American military 
man summed up the humiliating and costly defeat suffered by the South Vietnamese army at 
the hands of outnumbered Communist guerillas in the fight for the jungle hamlet (Ap Bac) 30 
miles south of Saigon. It was perhaps the strongest criticism by an American military adviser, 
but others in the battle said it was not an unfair one."
78
 
 There were many more articles like this that reported the difficulties facing US policy 
in Vietnam, and how they might lead to a long and tiring military conflict. Despite these 
reports, the majority of the U.S. public didn't seem to panic. This was in large part because of 
the work of the Kennedy Administration. The administration continuously downplayed the 
involvement of American troops to Vietnam, and the papers took the bait, as in 1961, a press 
conference in which Kennedy acknowledged that more men and supplies were going to 
Vietnam, was featured in a small article on the bottom of the first page of the New York 
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Times. Meanwhile, the main article was one about the ongoing conflict in the Congo...written 
by David Halberstam.
79
 
 Nowadays, we as individuals have so many free resources (social media, different 
news outlets) that we can use to check whether what we see is true and whether we want to 
believe it. In the period of the Vietnam war, times were different and many people were 
naturally inclined to believe official reports that came from the President, something which 
drastically changed after the Watergate scandal. At the same time, not all reporters shared the 
same opinion and this is a matter that has been discussed before. It has never been proven that 
Washington deliberately urged reporters to write positively, but they did know who to send to 
Vietnam and it was because of conflicting reports such as these that people were less inclined 
to believe Halberstam and his fellow journalists in Saigon. It is interesting to see, 
nevertheless, that even reports from Higgins and Alsop weren't necessarily always meant to 
calm people down back home.  For example, Higgins shows this as she warns the American 
public that things are about to turn ugly if Diem is disposed "'A succesful coup d'etat against 
Diem would probably set the war back 12 months.' [...] The tragic irony of South Vietnam 
today is that its worldwide image is being tarnished at a period when the war is going better 
than ever. Its little people are more secure from Viet Cong attack and better fed at any time 
since the Communists unleashed their cruel military assault in 1961."
80
 Although this 
demonstrates the unwavering support from Higgins towards Diem, it does show that reports 
from journalists such as Higgins weren't always positive. 
 Reports from experienced reporters such as Higgins and Alsop created doubts, not 
only amongst editors but most likely also amongst readers and therefore it doesn't seem 
illogical that many kept turning to the government for information on the war. Television 
would become a more powerful medium in the latter stages of the war and this would 
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definitely change the sentiment in the U.S., but during the time of Halberstam, television was 
yet to become a big player on the Vietnam stage. 
 The Buddhist protests marked a turning point in how the Kennedy Administration 
looked at reporters like Halberstam. Before the beginning of the conflict, and at the start of it, 
the focus was mainly on selective openness. The administration was willing to share many 
details, and to give reporters lots of access, but only for its own good. Once the Buddhist 
protests started to erupt, the administration made an important change and this had to do with 
the position of the U.S. Ambassador. When Halberstam arrived in 1962 Fredrick Nolting was 
the ambassador to South Vietnam. However, in August 1963 Kennedy replaced him with 
Henry Cabot Lodge, the main reason being the erupting situation in Vietnam and the fact that 
Nolting, according to Kennedy, was too close with Diem to make a change. This change 
would mean a lot for the Saigon press corps and it sent a message to Halberstam and others. 
For the first time, the U.S. was seemingly not that interested in his work (in a good way). 
Nolting had often ignored him and was wary of many journalists who got too close to the 
story.   Lodge was a pleasant surprise. Kennedy had sent him with a simple order: to persuade 
Diem to change his way of governing and to restore order in Vietnam. The 'problems' with the 
press were not his biggest concern anymore. Lodge even told Peter Arnett a story about him 
and president Kennedy talking about the Buddhist protests and his upcoming promotion: "I 
remember going into the Oval Office and there was the picture of this old man sitting cross-
legged burning himself alive, and President Kennedy said, 'Look at that, look at what things 
have come to in Vietnam. I have confidence in you, I want you to go out there and see if we 
can't get the government to behave better.'"
81
 Kennedy was no longer blaming messengers 
such as Halberstam for the message they were carrying, he was starting to focus on the main 
problem, Diem's behavior and the political tensions in South Vietnam. 
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 Before the switch to Lodge, the U.S. administration had endorsed a different tactic 
and, as John Mecklin says, it was aimed at keeping the journalists away from the news. The 
U.S. officials were urged to keep newsmen away from military activities that had a risk of 
leading to 'undesirable stories'. If they could manage to keep these 'undesirable stories' away 
from the public, then the U.S. mission, they thought, would become a lot more easier. A 
subcommittee was formed within the U.S. congress and this committee, consisting of several 
congress members, was the first to read this new strategy. The committee didn't like what it 
saw, and criticized it : "The restrictive U.S. press policy in Vietnam unquestionably 
contributed to the lack of information about conditions in Vietnam which created an 
international crisis. Instead of hiding the facts from the American public, the State 
Department should have done everything possible to expose the true situation to full view." 
Still, despite the criticism from Washington itself, the strategy was put into place in 1962 in a 
time when Halberstam had just arrived in Saigon.
82
  
 As time passed, the U.S. realized that its problems with the press could be reduced by 
simply taking care of the biggest problem, which was the instability of South Vietnam. This 
meant that Halberstam had more freedom to do his journalistic work, but it did not undermine 
support for the war because the majority of the American public remained ignorant and 
uninterested.  As U.S. official John Mecklin stated to ambassador Fredrick Nolting: "The 
reality [is] that the newsmen here will continue to find access to very much the truth of what's 
going on, regardless of what we may do. I think it's futile to try to 'control' them, or cut off 
their sources. Americans, even in the military, simply don't work that way." Mecklin added 
that it would be more useful to cooperate as the government was now losing all influence over 
the reporters by shutting them out. Kennedy was not convinced when he spoke to Mecklin 
himself, but promised him that he would start to make some minor changes to alter their 
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relations with the press, for he knew just how important a good relationship with the press 
was. By replacing Nolting with Lodge, Kennedy eventually acknowledged that Mecklin was 
right in his assessment. 
83
 
 When we add all of this up it seems illogical to conclude that David Halberstam was 
responsible for undermining the war effort. The majority of the U.S. didn't care about the 
Vietnam conflict when he arrived and even when he was active during one of the first crises 
in Vietnam the public opinion seemingly didn't change much. At first, the U.S. officials did 
seem to see the Saigon press corps and Halberstam as a legitimate threat but the fact that 
Kennedy changed course during Halberstam's stay in Vietnam is a clear signal that they 
realized that journalists such as Halberstam couldn't be blamed if public opinion turned on 
them. They could only blame themselves. Still, as media-expert Graham Spencer concludes, 
the entire Vietnam conflict would eventually be a lesson for the American administration in 
how to manage the news during a war. In Vietnam, in its own eyes, it had largely failed and, 
according to Spencer, this 'Vietnam Syndrome' can be seen back in all of the conflicts that the 
U.S. has been involved in after Vietnam. He describes the 'Vietnam Syndrome' as a fear that 
complete freedom of the press had made the U.S. reluctant to embark on foreign 
interventions, especially if they risked or involved war.  The U.S. administration therefore 
tried to manage the news much more carefully.
84
 
 What did Halberstam himself think of all this?  How did he respond to the criticism 
that was thrown his way? And how did he explain the controversy surrounding the media and 
the Vietnam war?  In Making of a Quagmire, the first book that Halberstam wrote on the 
Vietnam War, he makes an interesting prediction and says that the Vietnam War would surely 
not be the last conflict of this kind. And in this he was right.  What is also telling is how 
critical Halberstam was of the government's tactics and approaches during the Vietnam War. 
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Halberstam himself was full of hope when he first entered Vietnam, and he even saw merit in 
the 'domino theory'. Making of a Quagmire was written in 1965, which meant that the 
Vietnam War was still ongoing at the time. At the end of his book, he describes in great detail 
how his optimism faded throughout his stay in Vietnam: "As I began to write my final piece 
before leaving the country, I had never been so pessimistic about Vietnam's future. I suppose 
that the only thing that made me at all hopeful was the fact that I was an American [...]. Many 
American friends whom I greatly respected, still believed that there was a chance to save the 
country, and this assuaged my pessimism somewhat."
85
 
 In the last quotation, Halberstam more or less responds to the criticism of 
conservatives that he was 'betraying' his own country. Halberstam explains that he actually 
believes that his American background made it impossible for him to be completely objective 
in this conflict, and that he always tried to see a bright spot. But he adds that he simply didn't 
see any change, except for the fact that the faces changed. What  is even more interesting is 
the solutions that Halberstam himself proposed in 1965 in order to 'solve' the conflict. 
Conservatives would make the claim that Halberstam, being a critic of the war, would support 
withdrawal. But in Making of a Quagmire Halberstam makes it clear that withdrawal of 
troops has some clear disadvantages. He mentions the image of the U.S. which would be 
badly tarnished if it would leave, and adds that withdrawal could easily lead to other countries 
being encouraged to follow the example of Hanoi. In other words, the domino theory hadn't 
completely left Halberstam's mind, and he believed that complete withdrawal would send the 
wrong message to the world. 
86
 As the title of the book states, Halberstam himself struggles 
immensely with the question 'how to solve the Vietnam conflict', and states that the U.S. is 
caught in a quagmire.   
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 One book that isn't broadly discussed in the literature written on the subject is 
Halberstam’s book on Ho Chi Minh. It is a rather small book, consisting only of 120 pages 
and it explains how, in his eyes, Ho Chi Minh was able to be successful and how the U.S. was 
unknowingly fighting one of the most inspiring leaders in the world. He also explains that he 
believes that it was sheer arrogance that cost the U.S. a chance of victory, viewing themselves 
as being superior to the French, whom Americans regarded as weak, discredited colonialists.
87
 
In his first book, Making of a Quagmire, Halberstam also refers to the French colonial period, 
saying that it left a legacy that assured that it was a lost cause from the start. Although he 
doesn't use the same words in his first book, between the lines he more or less says that the 
Americans could have learned from the 'French experience'.  
Throughout the book Ho, Halberstam praises the methods of the Communist 
government in the North and its willpower while acknowledging the many mistakes that the 
U.S. government made. Just as in Making of a Quagmire, David Halberstam doesn't mention 
the media criticism at all, as if he is completely sure that he and his journalist colleagues 
couldn't be blamed. For others, a book such as this is a great example of Halberstam being a 
communist sympathizer, and there seem to be signs of the U.S. government being suspicious 
of that. In 2008, several students at the City University of New York's Graduate School of 
Journalism did a research and asked for FBI documents showing whether there was any 
history of government institutions following Halberstam. The documents showed that from 
1965 onwards, when Halberstam had begun to cover the Cold War in Poland, the FBI had 
been closely monitoring his reports and his whereabouts. And in 1971, they were even 
thinking about conducting a series of interviews with Halberstam itself, the same year that he 
wrote his book on Ho Chi Minh. The report doesn't state why they wanted to have to talk to 
him, and the conservations eventually didn't take place. But it does seem very coincidental 
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and the files do show that they at least thought that Halberstam's reports, books and overall 
behavior was suspicious enough to spy on him. Though it must be said that the FBI in this day 
and age was spying on just about everyone.
88
 
 In  Halberstam's following book, The Best and the Brightest, he touched on the very 
core of U.S. problems in Vietnam: the failing foreign policy of the U.S. government. 
Halberstam criticized U.S. foreign policy on every level. He also detailed how big the fear for 
the Saigon press corps was, arguing that the government was convinced, from the beginning 
that this war could only be lost if the media got too close. Fredrick Nolting frequently 
complained to Washington that reporters like Halberstam were harmful to the U.S. policy 
with their sensationalized reports. 
89
 Halberstam also discussed Joseph Alsop, one of his 
fiercest critics, asserting that Alsop was one of the proponents of the so-called 'domino 
theory.' Alsop, he says, was very critical of the U.S. government 'losing' China to 
communism. Halberstam in return says that these Alsop articles weren't 'particularly 
thoughtful or deep' and that they created the false illusion that America could lose countries 
that didn't even fall under their control. 
90
 Compared to his previous books, The Best and the 
Brightest is the first in which Halberstam openly talked about the criticism that he and his 
colleagues received for their supposed biased reporting. He explains how the U.S. 
administration was disappointed how the Communists managed to 'control' their journalists, 
whereas they couldn't control theirs. When looking at his own criticism of Alsop, it has 
interesting to see that Halberstam had definitely taken a clear turn against the 'domino theory.' 
In Making of a Quagmire, he acknowledged that withdrawing from Vietnam completely 
carried a risk because other countries could see it as a sign that a civil uprising such as in 
Vietnam could work in their own country as well. Overall, the tone of criticism in his later 
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books is much fiercer of American policy than it is in his first book on Vietnam. Halberstam 
attributes this change to the many interviews he conducted with government officials as to 
find out more about the political reasoning behind the decisions made with regards to 
Vietnam.  
 Halberstam seems to downplay his own influence even more in the book The Powers 
That Be, a detailed study of four major media institutions (Washington Post, Los Angeles 
Times, Time-Life, and CBS). In his chapter on CBS he criticized television news for having no 
"memory," meaning that an image will be shown and one second later it is gone and mostly 
forgotten.  From 1964 on, he believes, the government started to pay more attention to 
television, with newspapers becoming less important.  Even though this book doesn't put as 
much focus on government decision-making than his previous works, it does show that these 
big media-companies were very influential. The growth of television journalism drastically 
changed the landscape of wartime news management. 
91
  
 What the books show, and what Halberstam himself explains, is that he, at first, saw 
merit in an America mission in South Vietnam. But during his stay he got to see the other side 
of the story. Later on he did a lot of investigating, interviewing government officials, fellow 
journalists, and editors who had experience with the Vietnam conflict. And as he found out 
more, he became more negative. This becomes clear when reading his books where it seems 
that over the years Halberstam was definitely becoming more and more negative about the 
Vietnam War, especially when it came to the U.S. government and its policies. And one can't 
blame him for doing so when looking at the facts. 
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Conclusion 
‘Over the next ten years, as the little war grew larger and uglier, America's self-destructive 
obsession in Vietnam would come to be known by many possessive nicknames: McNamara's 
War, [...] Johnson's War, [...] Nixon's War, [...] and, eventually, Television's War [...] 
 
But all that came later, over the next year, during the first great Vietnam crisis, the one that 
led the United States into the muck for a decade, the war would not even become known as 
Kennedy's War. It would take on a different nickname, a pejorative one that came out of the 
White House and the Pentagon. 
 
They called it Halberstam's War.' 
 
- William Prochnau in Once Upon a Distant War 
 
 Halberstam, like many other young reporters, came to Vietnam as a carte blanche. He 
didn't know a lot in terms of details and he believed that the Americans were doing the right 
thing in protecting South Vietnam. In other words, when Halberstam arrived he supported the 
policy of the American government. American officials in return tried to make sure that 
young reporters such as Halberstam stayed on their side. They tried to build a relationship by 
immediately sharing lots of information, the idea behind it was that it would make a reporter 
feel special and that he wouldn't go out and search for more information on his own. The 
American government wanted the reporters to rely on their information. This was an idea that 
can be traced back to the beginning of the Kennedy administration, where the White House 
was more open than ever. That was, until you did something to cross the line and at that point 
you would soon become a persona non grata in Washington.  
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 It was a strategy that, in the case of Halberstam and many others, only worked for a 
short period of time. Halberstam was soon warned that American officials were trying to get 
him on their side and were therefore trying to make him feel special. And indeed, he  noticed 
how every young reporter was nicely approached by an American official who would share a 
load of information and act as if it was the way that business was handled in Saigon. The 
problem with such a strategy is that journalists, and especially young journalists with a bright 
future such as Halberstam, are curious. Curious to seek out information and to go beyond 
boundaries to get this information. Whereas the 'old-timers' such as Higgins and Alsop were 
critical of these young journalists and continuously supported the Diem administration, the 
new generation consisting of Halberstam, Sheehan and others were following their own path. 
 Experienced journalists such as Higgins and Alsop, together with government 
officials, soon claimed that David Halberstam was an unpatriotic weakling who didn't 
understand that his reports were hurting the cause. However, it is telling that even an 
American official such as John Mecklin admitted that this criticism was unfair. Mecklin did 
believe that Halberstam was too critical at times and he also believed that he didn't mind to 
see the Americans fail. But during Buddhist crisis, which would be one of the most important 
events during Halberstam's stay, Mecklin believed that the journalists weren't to blame. The 
Diem administration and the American officials were shooting themselves in the foot, and 
people like Halberstam were simply reporting it. As Peter Arnett said, it isn't fair to blame the 
messenger for the content that he is carrying. 
 Still, Halberstam's behavior angered not only the Kennedy administration but also his 
editors; the latter started to doubt whether he wasn't trying to push his own pro-communist 
agenda. This is a theme that is also still very popular with conservative critics, who also point 
to the fact that experienced journalists such as Alsop and Higgins held vastly different 
opinions. Halberstam's editors were also struggling with this fact, why was their own, young 
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and unproven reporter coming back with all these negative stories while other, more 
experienced reporters were saying that it wasn't going that bad? The fact that Halberstam, 
despite all these doubts, still managed to get his stories across, says a lot about his confidence 
and determination as a journalist. Besides that, it has also become clear that one of the most 
critical journalists in this story, Joe Alsop, can hardly be taken seriously as an objective 
journalist considering his extremely close relationship with Kennedy and Ngo Dinh Diem.  
 Throughout the literature one doesn't get the sense that Halberstam was indeed 
pushing his own agenda. He was simply an example of a young, promising reporter who was 
trying to be the best there was in Saigon. As explained before, journalists are typically 
egocentric personalities who will reach for unorthodox measures to get their information. This 
also frustrated the American officials, as Halberstam would frequently get information at a 
faster rate than they would. The fact that Halberstam worked so fast, and that his reports 
weren't always that positive, made him unpopular figure amongst the government. But the 
shift in American policy (e.g. the switch from Nolting to Lodge as ambassador) shows how 
even the American administration was starting to realize that it's previous policy hadn't been 
working. Instead of shutting out reporters that were, in their opinion, too critical, they were 
now realizing that it made no sense to fight a war against the media, as it was only distracting 
them from the actual war against the Viet Cong. They understood that someone like David 
Halberstam had a lot influence, but they also understood that it wasn't helping their own cause 
if they were continuously trying to wage a public relations war with him.  
 In terms of undermining the war effort it becomes clear that despite Halberstam's 
influence, the majority of the American public still didn't care about the conflict in South-East 
Asia. Even before Halberstam arrived, critical reports had come out and found their way into 
American newspapers. And once Halberstam was actually in Vietnam, the critical content 
only grew. Still, the American public was largely uninterested in the topic and perhaps this 
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could also be the reason for the shift in the American public relations policy in Vietnam. Even 
though they despised Halberstam, they also realized that they may have been overrating his 
influence in terms of war support. Next to that, as said before, it doesn't seem like Halberstam 
was deliberately critical, although conservatives will point to Alsop and the fact one of his 
books was one on Ho Chi Minh. In terms of undermining war support, Halberstam was 
certainly influential but not really creating a change of mentality amongst the American 
public. One could say that he was raising awareness, but that the Kennedy administration, 
together with the New York Times editors, made sure that his reports wouldn't get extra 
attention that could have possibly undermined war support in the USA. 
 Throughout the years, Halberstam continued to criticize the American government in 
the books that he published. These were much more critical than the actual reports that came 
out of Saigon (which shouldn't be a surprise, since a journalist should always try to remain 
objective). This has also been used as a piece of criticism, as it could possibly show that 
Halberstam had been a fierce opponent of the American government the entire time. But when 
reading the books, and also reading different literature about Halberstam's journey, one 
doesn't get this impression.  He has received praise from numerous colleagues, something that 
he probably would not have done had he really been functioning as a subjective, anti-
government, communist-sympathizing journalist. Next to that, the facts stated in his books on 
the course of the Vietnam war are also backed by other books written on the Vietnam conflict 
and the influence of the media. It is fair to say that David Halberstam was probably one of the 
most critical journalists that had been active during the Vietnam War, and as shown by the 
quote at the top of this final chapter, his presence and influence didn't go unnoticed in 
Washington. But in the end, it is unfair to claim that he undermined the war support in 
America.  The numbers show that interest in the Vietnam conflict was still quite low during 
his stay in Vietnam, and in terms of deliberately trying to sabotage the American war effort it 
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simply came down to Halberstam doing his job. The American government, and colleagues 
such as Alsop and Higgins, believed that a journalist always had to think about what is best 
for his own country. Alsop and Higgins didn't think and work like journalists, they worked 
and reported as Americans. David Halberstam however, wasn't an American first. He was a 
journalist first, and an American second.  
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